Are We Really Better Than Algorithms?

It's interesting looking at (two in particular) this week's scholarship on algorithms, situating them in the contexts of everyday life and us as human beings, respectively.

Algorithms are defined and re-defined in many ways in both texts, but the most explicit case was: "incredibly relational- it is the relation that defines, describes and shapes how that data are then (re)presented. These relations are defined and designed by the architects of the algorithm according to a design brief, a particular desire or identified output, and shaped by technical specificity, commercial incentive and social predispositions, bias and cultural understandings." (Willson, p.148)

A recurring idea is that algorithms are these models built on collected data and used to manipulate and achieve various goals. There is a tone of warning across the two texts, which is situated in a general global attitude that an algorithm-heavy world removes humanity and autonomy from existence.

At risk of sounding super cynical, which is almost a cliche in the Arts faculty, I feel as if algorithms just reflect human nature. The argument that what separates algorithms from people is the ability for us to register and appreciate "concepts", "context" and "judgement" so that the right result, as opposed to the correct result, in a given situation is reached feels off.

Algorithmic bias doesn't seem to be the result of an algorithm's lack of contextual appreciation, but more as a result of the design of the algorithm and- as it stands- people design said algorithms. Hence, the bias comes from the people not the algorithm. In addition to that, people are biased as all hell. People often use notions like fairness and objectivity regarding things like statistics when making a case for the rationality of their decisions, usually to debate accusations of bias. But this process usually involves a selective use of data. Algorithms, although unable to consider compassion in a case-by-case basis like we would ideally believe that humans can and would do, consider all this data that we have access to- much faster- and formulate "opinions" with consideration to all aspects of a scenario.

In essence, numbers don't pigeon-hole people; people pigeon-hole people, and use numbers to make it look like they don't.

Are you sure about that?

I noticed a particularly clear, which is unusual for me in this class, shared theme between some of the reading material this week. The Illiadis and Russo reading, as well as the introduction chapter from Mark Andrejevic, both addressed the idea of certainty in the world of ubiquitous media.

In breaking down Critical Data Studies (CDS), Illiadis and Russo illustrate Big Data as not just the environment of information, but more realistically as an archive of fiction and fact. They present the idea of data disorder, a multiplicity and subsequent conflict of primary, secondary derivative and meta data. The central point being that the infinite broadness of a big data world creates a lack of clarity and, in doing so, a lack of substantive conclusions. Going on to point out how, under the veil of "openness", such a multitude of supposed information (the word itself placing outside the idea of fact and fiction in published content) can be counter-intuitively weaponised in a war against absolute understanding.

The article, overall, illustrates a causative relationship between big data and uncertainty. Uncertainty discerned from a growing inability to make absolute conclusions, stemming from an increasing multitude of conflicting statements facilitated by modern media.

Andrejevic takes this a bit further. He more directly discusses this idea established here by labelling it as a paradox. The paradox itself being expressed as: "increased access to information means it becomes impossible to comprehend it all", or "all the info means no info."

This continues into a lack of trust in news media because of an increase in counter news, as well as the peoples distrust in mainstream media based on the idea of partiality; this reflexive awareness of incompleteness. He also directly discussed the "borrowed kettle" media metaphor. The metaphor referring to confusing stories by using multiple narratives. A culture of multiple, intended-use instructive narratives rather than a dominant narrative.

One thing Andrejevic does say that I'm not sure I agree with is his discussion of decision "paralysis." David Shenk makes this claim that there is a paralysis of decisions in the world we live in, essentially that people are avoiding conclusions because the amount of information available is too daunting. Andrejevic goes on to try debunking this with the claim that people continue to draw decisions all the time, especially given pressure to do so.

He misses Shenk's underlying point. The "paralysis" refers to the idea of being uncertain of any decision we make, questioning if there are even real decisions made in big data era, not the actual making of decisions. Essentially, we are paralysed in our decision making because we are uncertain if our decisions matter because we can't be sure of any information we are exposed to's authenticity.

For example, the scarcity of information in Athenian democracy lead to certainty. One source, one understanding.

A Crash Course on Embodiment

Taking the philosophical idea of embodiment and placing it in the context of ubiquitous media might be the single most central component of actualising the future pursued by the subject.

Although extremely heavy on theory rather than real-world media technology, Paul Dourish's article outlines a clear picture of what "embodiment" actually translates to.

The conclusion of the piece states that Dourish's preliminary understanding of embodiment was as things that occur in real time and space. He develops this to say that embodiment is the idea of our engagement with that reality that results in meaning; what might be called life. He then brings in the link to technology by explaining that embodied interaction is application and influence of this life-meaning with artefacts; or media.

This is built via a crash course in phenomenological academia regarding the notion of embodiment. Phenomenology still not being entirely clear to me- I think it's the study of things and how that reflects existence rather than typical philosophy which is usual about what is the wider nature that constitutes things regarding existence.

This crash course essentially follows this syllabus:

Edmund Husserl; how the life-world is based in everyday embodied experience

Alfred Schutz; how the ‘life-world’ could be extended to address problems in social interaction

Martin Heideggar; embodied action is essential to our mode of being and to the ways in which we encounter the world

Maurice Merleau-Ponty; the body is critical in mediating between internal and external experience

Altogether, when considered in relation to the vision for ubiquitous media, the philosophy of embodiment would apply in the sense that, presumably, technology would be as tacit as any other day-to-day action and thus would be part of ‘life’ itself, therefore being the legitimate thing with which we take part in life. I would almost argue, following this notion, would mean that the idea of internal and external experience needs to be rethought.

Dourish, P., & Dourish, P. (2004). "Being-in-the-World": Embodied Interaction. In Where the action is: The foundations of embodied interaction (1st ed., pp. 99-126). Cambridge: MIT Press.

On the Wedge of Glory

It would make sense to take a simple concept and spend an entire chapter elaborating on it when the inferred idea of the "wedge" concept is established in the first page.

Richard Coyne establishes early on that the physical form of a wedge is being used as a symbol for innovation early in the text. The statement “it surely is an instrument of adjustment” in response to the question of what is the most pervasive device through modern development; while the continuing to point out the importance of “small scale interventions” to the success of said development.

The idea of a wedge as a small tool used to make adjustments that contribute to the overall cohesion of development through history is set up as a metaphor for the small changes made as part of the technological evolution taking place in the pursuit of ubiquitous media. The implication is that the sort of innovation needed cannot be done in leaps and bounds. This notion is correct in a couple of senses.

The first, is that there are limitations that immediately bar human capacity for large jumps in innovation of this kind. What I mean, and what Coyne painstakingly spells out for the reader, is that if humankind discovers fire on Tuesday, they won’t have coal engines on Friday. The wooden wedge metaphor being applied here, maybe the more appropriate example is if you have a stable surface on Tuesday you won’t have apartment buildings on Friday. The wedge represents the little innovations in the journey towards completing big ones. In this way, technological innovation is the same, albeit more rapid than other technological advances in our history.

The second, and less clearly addressed, is that if innovations too grand were introduced to humankind there would likely be confusion and fear that would create a backlash against said introduction. This is more implied in the chapter from Coyne when talking about calibration and tuning. What I discerned from this is the importance of considering the environmental factors of innovation. Things need to cooperate together, rather than having anyone thing advance significantly past another, otherwise the overall result is incompatibility. This idea is more sociological than physical.